{"id":2120,"date":"2013-06-08T01:22:25","date_gmt":"2013-06-07T18:22:25","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/?p=2120"},"modified":"2013-06-18T23:02:07","modified_gmt":"2013-06-18T16:02:07","slug":"matonyte-i-baltic-sea-region-elites%e2%80%99-and-masses%e2%80%99-perceptions-of-major-constituents-of-the-european-identity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/?p=2120","title":{"rendered":"Matonyte I. Baltic Sea Region elites\u2019 and masses\u2019 perceptions of major constituents of the European identity"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

Data about the author.<\/strong> Irmina Matonyte, Ph.D., professor, ISM University of Management and Economics, Vilnius, Lithuania. Academic interests: post-communist elites, europeanization, political communication, women in politics.<\/p>\n

Summary.<\/strong> The paper dwells on insights from big-scale surveys (INTUNE Project, financed by the European Commission), conducted in 2007 and 2009 in 18 EU member-states. Attitudes of elites (leaders in national political, economic, media and trade-union fields) and of general population (public opinion) from the countries, belonging to the Baltic Sea Region are examined. The study focuses on elites\u2019 and masses\u2019 perception of the most important attributes of the European identity.<\/p>\n

Baltic Sea Region elites\u2019 and masses\u2019 perceptions of major constituents of the European identity<\/strong><\/p>\n

From the legal point of view, the European citizenship is derived from national citizenships: a citizen of one EU member-state has citizenship rights in all EU member-states. However, a conceptual difference between the citizenship and the identity should be underlined. Europeanness<\/em> might be understood not as a mere collection of civic and political rights and obligations of a certain person or a group, but as a definite feeling and recognition of an identity, transmitted and articulated through belongingness to the same (shared) system of cultural codes and values as well as through participation in the same environment of social and political behavior.<\/p>\n

This paper investigates perceptions of Europeanness<\/em> in this wider (socio-political and cultural) sense. In particular, we focus on perceptions of elites and masses from the Baltic Sea Region (further, BSR), which bypasses the narrow geo-political term of the \u201cBaltic states\u201d (three small post-communist EU member-states, in the East bordering Russia and Belarus). Formally, the BSR includes 9 countries, which border the Baltic Sea: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Sweden [1, p. 66]. Since 2004 out of these 9 countries only Russia is not a member of the EU. This leads us to claim that the European frame as a reference of the socio-political and cultural identity is very relevant to the study of transformation of regional identities in early XXI century. The empirical research shows that the European and national identities in the countries of the BSR (minus Russia) might nurture anti-Russian stances [2, p. 24\u201328].<\/p>\n

The paper dwells on empirical data from three big-scale surveys (INTUNE Project, financed by the European Commission), conducted in 2007 and 2009 in 18 EU member-states. We examine attitudes of elites (leaders in national political, economic, media and trade-union segments) and of population (public opinion) from Estonia, Denmark, Germany, Lithuania, and Poland (these 5 countries are considered as a sub-sample of the BSR).<\/p>\n

Table 1. Description of the Baltic Sea Region elites\u2019 and populations\u2019 sample<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Group<\/p>\n

Country<\/td>\n

Political elite (2007)<\/td>\nPolitcal elite (2009)<\/td>\nEconomic elite (2007)<\/td>\nMedia elite\u00a0 (2009)<\/td>\nTrade union elite (2009)<\/td>\nTotal elites<\/td>\nPopulation (2009)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Denmark<\/td>\n60<\/td>\n44<\/td>\n40<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n151<\/td>\n1002<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Estonia<\/td>\n72<\/td>\n—<\/td>\n40<\/td>\n—<\/td>\n—<\/td>\n112<\/td>\n1000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Germany<\/td>\n80<\/td>\n79<\/td>\n43<\/td>\n35<\/td>\n24<\/td>\n261<\/td>\n1000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Lithuania<\/td>\n80<\/td>\n70<\/td>\n40<\/td>\n35<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n243<\/td>\n—<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Poland<\/td>\n80<\/td>\n85<\/td>\n42<\/td>\n35<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n257<\/td>\n1000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

<\/strong><\/p>\n

Previous research shows that in respect to the individual identification with Europe and actual patterns of Europeanness<\/em> the elites from the EU member-states do not diverge much along the lines of their segments (political, economic, media or trade-union) [3, p. 44]. Therefore, further we treat elites from the five EU member-state countries as compositing five relatively coherent groups.<\/p>\n

Also, prior research, based on factor analysis method, indicates that elites\u2019 and masses\u2019 understandings of what normative and behavioral characteristics of a person are the most important in order to turn one into a \u201ctrue\u201d national (for instance, Lithuanian) and\/ or a \u201ctrue\u201d European might be reasonably well grouped into two frames: ethnic<\/em> (ethnic-Christian) and civic<\/em> [4, p. 100\u2013102].<\/p>\n

Our research focuses on the BSR elites\u2019 and population\u2019s attitudes towards the main normative and behavioral characteristics of a \u201ctrue\u201d European (see Figures 1, 2 and 3) and it also reveals the dichotomy of civic<\/em> and ethnic<\/em> frames. The proponents of the civic<\/em> frame emphasize \u201cachieved\u201d attributes of the collective identity (to respect European laws and institutions, to master a non-native European language, to feel European). Numerically, the proponents of the civic<\/em> frame of the European identity dominate among the BSR elites and masses (75\u2013100 % of elites and masses of the BSR adhere to the civic<\/em> frame of the European identity definition). The ethnic<\/em> (ethnic-Christian) frame underlines \u201cascribed\u201d attributes of the collective identity (to be born in Europe, to have European parents, to be Christian).\u00a0 Dependent on the country and on the particular criterion of a \u201ctrue\u201d European, the size of the group of the proponents of the ethnic<\/em> (ethnic-Christian) frame varies from 8 to 75%. The survey data elegantly indicate that the two understandings of a \u201ctrue\u201d European might co-exist. They might parallel each other and compose two \u201cmatrioshkas\u201d:<\/em> a bigger civic<\/em> and a smaller ethnic<\/em> in the imaginary of representatives of elites and masses. A \u201cpure\u201d civic<\/em> frame (instances of respondents, for whom only civic<\/em> indicators would be somewhat or very important) is not very widely spread; even less is spread a \u201cpure\u201d ethnic<\/em> (ethnic-Christian) frame.<\/p>\n

Figure 1. BSR elites in 2007: perception of major attributes of the European identity<\/strong><\/p>\n

(based on the answers to the question: \u201cWhat is important in order to be a good (true) European<\/em>\u201d, a 4-point scale: 1 \u2013 very important, 2 \u2013 somewhat important, 3 \u2013 a little bit important, 4 \u2013 not important at all).<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The comparative data of the elites\u2019 perceptions in 2007 and 2009 (Figure 1 and 2) allow observing variations in the scope of a smaller (ethnic<\/em>, ethnic-Christian) frame in determining a \u201ctrue\u201d European. The factor of Christianity as a major constituent of the European identity raised fervent debates concerning the EU Constitutional Treaty. Yet, in late 2007 much less assertive Lisbon Treaty was adopted. Subsequently, as 2009 elite survey data show, \u201cbeing a Christian\u201d lost its importance in the eyes of the elites in the BSR as a whole. In Denmark the share of elites, sensitive to the Christian origins and values of the European identity decreased from 24 to 8 %, in Poland this share also went down by several percentage points. Yet, in Lithuania and Germany this share increased, respectively from 38 to 48 % and from 31 to 35 %. These particular shifts in elites\u2019 perceptions reflect not only changes in the EU-level discourse and agenda, but also changes in the structure of the elites in EU member-states (for instance, in late 2008 parliamentary elections brought into power overtly conservative-Christian democrat politicians in Lithuania).<\/p>\n

Over last years, the BSR elites\u2019 perceptions have also changed on two other dimensions of the ethnic<\/em> frame of the European identity. The general trend is towards shrinking of the ethnic<\/em> \u201cmatrioshka\u201d. If in 2007 the share of elites who thought that in order to qualify as a \u201ctrue\u201d European it is important to be born in Europe was 34\u201363 % (74 % in Estonia), in 2009 it decreased to 30\u201353 %. Similarly, the range of elites thinking that in order to be a \u201ctrue\u201d European one must have European parents was from 35 to 67 % (71 % in Estonia), but in 2009 this share decrease to 29\u201359 %. Slight changes in the national samples of elites are observed, with no clear-cut systemic pattern.<\/p>\n

The 2009 survey demonstrates that with an economic crisis looming around the importance of the civic<\/em> frame of identity increases among the BSR elites. During 2007\u20132009 in Denmark elites\u2019 support for sharing European cultural traditions moved up from 65 to 74%, in Poland \u201crespect EU laws and institutions\u201d increased from 85 to 89 %, etc.<\/p>\n

The comparative data of the elites\u2019 perceptions in 2007 and 2009 (Figure 1 and 2) allow observing variations in the scope of a smaller (ethnic<\/em>, ethnic-Christian) frame in determining a \u201ctrue\u201d European. The factor of Christianity as a major constituent of the European identity raised fervent debates concerning the EU Constitutional Treaty. Yet, in late 2007 much less assertive Lisbon Treaty was adopted. Subsequently, as 2009 elite survey data show, \u201cbeing a Christian\u201d lost its importance in the eyes of the elites in the BSR as a whole. In Denmark the share of elites, sensitive to the Christian origins and values of the European identity decreased from 24 to 8 %, in Poland this share also went down by several percentage points. Yet, in Lithuania and Germany this share increased, respectively from 38 to 48 % and from 31 to 35 %. These particular shifts in elites\u2019 perceptions reflect not only changes in the EU-level discourse and agenda, but also changes in the structure of the elites in EU member-states (for instance, in late 2008 parliamentary elections brought into power overtly conservative-Christian democrat politicians in Lithuania).<\/p>\n

Over last years, the BSR elites\u2019 perceptions have also changed on two other dimensions of the ethnic<\/em> frame of the European identity. The general trend is towards shrinking of the ethnic<\/em> \u201cmatrioshka\u201d. If in 2007 the share of elites who thought that in order to qualify as a \u201ctrue\u201d European it is important to be born in Europe was 34\u201363 % (74 % in Estonia), in 2009 it decreased to 30\u201353 %. Similarly, the range of elites thinking that in order to be a \u201ctrue\u201d European one must have European parents was from 35 to 67 % (71 % in Estonia), but in 2009 this share decrease to 29\u201359 %. Slight changes in the national samples of elites are observed, with no clear-cut systemic pattern.<\/p>\n

The 2009 survey demonstrates that with an economic crisis looming around the importance of the civic<\/em> frame of identity increases among the BSR elites. During 2007\u20132009 in Denmark elites\u2019 support for sharing European cultural traditions moved up from 65 to 74%, in Poland \u201crespect EU laws and institutions\u201d increased from 85 to 89 %, etc.<\/p>\n

Figure 2. BSR elites in 2009: perception of major attributes of the European identity<\/strong><\/p>\n

(based on the answers to the question: \u201cWhat is important in order to be a good (true) European<\/em>\u201d, a 4-point scale: 1 \u2013 very important, 2 \u2013 somewhat important, 3 \u2013 a little bit important, 4 \u2013 not important at all).<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

As to the divide elites versus<\/em> masses (Figures 1 and 2 versus<\/em> Figure 3), first thing to be underlined is the following: the discrepancy (range, amplitude) in perceptions of what values and behavioral characteristics make a \u201ctrue\u201d European among masses of the BSR countries is smaller than among respective elites. The populations of the BSR countries are the most divided on the issue of Christianity (difference by 25% points) and other two ethnic<\/em> frames (15\u201320% points). Yet, even on these three ethnic <\/em>(ethnic-Christian) dimensions the scope of the disagreement among the BSR masses is smaller than among respective elites (the BSR elites in their perception of the importance of the three ethnic<\/em> criteria differ by 45\u201330% points). Another landmark feature of the BSR masses\u2019 perceptions of a \u201ctrue\u201d European is detected in a relatively bigger size of the ethnic<\/em> \u201cmatrioshka\u201d and a relatively smaller size of the civic \u201cmatrioshka\u201d than they are in the case of the BSR elites.<\/p>\n

Last but not least, there is a very strong consensus among the BSR populations meaning that the utmost important attribute of a \u201ctrue\u201d European is to respect the EU laws and institutions (variation by mere 1\u20132% points), while among the BSR elites respect for the EU laws and institutions breeds some internal disagreement (variation by around 10 % points) and among elites this criterion is not the most important of a \u201ctrue\u201d European (for a \u201ctrue\u201d European, according to the elites, it is much more important to feel European and to master a non-native European language). Thus, a provocative generalization entails:\u00a0 the Habermasian \u201cconstitutional patriotism\u201d [5] is stronger among the BSR masses than among its elites.<\/p>\n

Figure 3. BSR population in 2009: perception of major attributes of the European identity<\/strong> (based on the answers to the question: \u201cWhat is important in order to be a good (true) European\u201d,\u00a0 a 4-point scale: 1 \u2013 very important, 2 \u2013 somewhat important, 3 \u2013 a little bit important, 4 \u2013 not important at all).<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

By all means, according to the BSR elites and masses, the factor \u201cto be a Christian\u201d is the least important for a \u2018true\u201d European (even among Polish masses and elites it is ranked lowest). The benchmark of a \u201ctrue\u201d European being a Christian is more important for masses than for elites in the BSR. Yet, the Estonian data provide a caveat: here 38 % elites versus<\/em> 27 % masses think that in order to be a \u201ctrue\u201d European one needs to be a Christian. In the whole BSR, the Estonian population appears having the most secularized outlook of the European identity. The biggest gap between elites and masses in this respect is observed in Denmark (8% elites and 31% masses think that the Christian frame is important in the European identity). The Polish and German elites and masses are rather coherent and consensual in their views of the relevance of the Christian frame of Europeanness<\/em>.<\/p>\n

In general, German and Danish elites and masses exhibit the most salient civic<\/em> frames of the European identity. The Estonian elites are the champions of the ethnic<\/em> framing of the European identity (not only among the BSR elites, but also among the elites in the whole EU [6, p. 59]. In the BSR the Polish population provides the strongest support for the ethnic<\/em> (ethnic-Christian) framing of the European identity. In the BSR, the Lithuanians (elites) usually occupy \u201ccentrist\u201d positions and place themselves between, on one hand, the civic<\/em> Germans and Danes and, on the other hand, the ethnic<\/em> Estonians and ethnic-Christian<\/em> Poles.<\/p>\n

Conclusions<\/strong><\/p>\n

The BSR is a fitting sample of the whole EU: it includes founding and old-time members of the EU (Germany, Denmark) along with post-socialist countries (Poland, Estonia and Lithuania), it exhibits the Nordic dimension (Estonia, Denmark) as well as embraces big and small countries. The scope and eventual specificities of the BSR \u201cregional stamp\u201d of the European identity framing might be deeper explored comparing the data from the elites\u2019 and masses\u2019 surveys of the BSR with the data from the southern Europe.<\/p>\n

Several theoretical implications from the research, focused on the BSR, might be drawn. First of all, the social constructivist insights are very pertinent in shaping the social understanding (and practices) of the European identity. As to the elite approach, claiming that elites (fully) control the social processes, the evidence is pretty inconclusive: at least, in terms of the definition of the European identity elites do not have an upper hand over masses. For instance, the Estonian elites, in response to the Estonian public opinion, might well reconsider their claim that a \u201ctrue\u201d European should be Christian. Finally, the study of the European identity framing in the BSR might be enriched by considerations from geopolitics. As mentioned at the outset of the article, the BSR includes Russia. The Russian factor (perceptions of the European identity by Russian elites and population \u2013 in any case, at least from the Russian regions neighboring the Baltic sea \u2013 and perceptions of the BSR elites and masses from the EU-member states concerning positive (or negative) roles, played by Russia vis-?-vis<\/em> the EU might shed additional light on intricate processes of the European identity articulation in early XXI century.<\/p>\n

References<\/em><\/p>\n

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\n6. Best H. The Elite-Population Gap in the Formation of Political Identities. A Cross-Cultural investigation \/\/ \u041f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u044d\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044b \u0432 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u0438 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043c\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u044f\u0445 \/ \u041f\u043e\u0434 \u0440\u0435\u0434. \u041e.\u0412. \u0413\u0430\u043c\u0430\u043d-\u0413\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0442\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0439, \u0410.\u041f. \u041a\u043b\u0435\u043c\u0435\u0448\u0435\u0432\u0430. \u041a\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434, 2012. P. 57\u201371.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Data about the author. Irmina Matonyte, Ph.D., professor, ISM University of Management and Economics, Vilnius, Lithuania. Academic interests: post-communist elites, europeanization, political communication, women in politics. Summary. The paper dwells on insights from big-scale surveys (INTUNE Project, financed by the European Commission), conducted in 2007 and 2009 in 18 EU member-states. Attitudes of elites (leaders …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[4,1],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2120"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2120"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2120\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2189,"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2120\/revisions\/2189"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2120"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2120"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ashpi.asu.ru\/ic\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2120"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}